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INTRODUCTION
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
Noncompetition agreements, also referred to as covenants not to
compete, are employer mechanisms that prevent or restrict employee
competition upon termination or voluntary separation.
Noncompetition agreements are widely used within a variety of
industries and provide employers with an ability to protect valuable
interests through injunctive remedies against competing former
employees.' The decision to enforce a noncompete agreement and,
thus, to curtail individual freedom, is weighty. A valid noncompete
agreement limits an individual's right to pursue a livelihood. Thus,
the standards by which noncompete agreements are enforced must
carefully balance employer interests and individual autonomy.
Louisiana, like the majority of other states,4 has a strong public
policy disfavoring covenants that restrain individuals from competing
with their former employers.5 Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 (the
2. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438,479,48 S. Ct. 564, 573 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the
Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 721,
723 (2002) ("In the past decade, there has been an exponential increase in the
volume of lawsuits between employers and former employees involving covenants
not to compete and the ownership of information and knowledge."); Gillian Lester,
Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost
Analysis, 76 Ind. L.J. 49, 51 (2001) ("Restrictive covenants are an increasingly
common feature of employment, used across a wide range of industries,
occupations, and employees.").
4. See, e.g., Clark Substations, L.L.C. v. Ware, 838 So. 2d 360, 363 (Ala.
2002) (stating that the state has a public policy against noncompetition agreements);
Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596, 600 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (same);
Farmer v. Airco, Inc., 204 S.E.2d 580, 582 (Ga. 1974) (same); Peterson-Jorwic
Group, Inc. v. Pecora, 586 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (same); Bennet v.
Storz Broadcasting Co., 134 N.W.2d 892,898 (Minn. 1965) (same); A.N. Deringer,
Inc. v. Troia, 178 A.D.2d 1023 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Carolina Chemical
Equipment Co., Inc. v. Muckenfuss, 471 S.E.2d 721, 723 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996)
(same). See also, Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir.
1955) ("Such [noncompetition] contracts were regarded with high disfavor under
the old common law. And they are so regarded, in general, by modem courts,
though apparently with some amelioration of the ancient disfavor."); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 187 (1981) ("A promise to refrain from competition that
imposes a restraint that is not ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or
relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade.").
5. See, e.g., SWAT24, 808 So. 2d at 298 ( "[T]he longstanding public policy
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"Statute") 6 reflects this policy by providing that all noncompetition
agreements are null and void except those that comply with the
Statute.7 Section C of the Statute ("Section C") sanctions certain
covenants not to compete between employers and employees.8 That
section provides that an employee may agree with his employer to be
restrained "from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that
of the employer... within a specified parish or parishes, municipality
or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer carries on
a like business therein, not to exceed a period of two years from
termination of employment."9
In SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond,'0 the Louisiana
Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuit courts of appeal by
interpreting Section C's phrase, "carrying on or engaging in a
business[,]" to denote that a former employee could be restrained only
from opening a competing business." Thus, the court invalidated
covenants not to compete that serve to restrict an individual from
securing employment with a competitor of his former employer. 2
Two years later, the Louisiana legislature responded to this portion of
the supreme court's decision in SWAT24 by enacting an amendment
of Louisiana has been to prohibit or severely restrict such agreements."); Louisiana
Smoked Products, Inc. v. Savoie's Sausage & Food Products, 696 So. 2d 1373,
1379 (La. 1997); LaFourche Speech & Language Services, Inc. v. Juckett, 652 So.
2d 679 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writ denied, 654 So. 2d 351 (La. 1996); Sentilles
Optical Services, Div. of Senasco, Inc. v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2nd
Cir. 1995); Moreno and Associates v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91, 93 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1999), writ denied, 745 So. 2d 606 (La. 1999) ("Noncompete agreements have
historically been frowned upon in Louisiana."); Aon Risk Services of Louisiana,
Inc. v. Ryan, 807 So. 2d 1058 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002); Bail Bonds Unlimited, Inc.
v. Chedville, 831 So. 2d 403, 405-406 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2002), writ denied, 836
So. 2d 104 (La. 2003).
6. La. R.S. 23:921 (2002). See Appendix A for the entire text of La. R.S.
23:921.
7. La. R.S. 23:921(A)(1) (2002) provides: "Every contract or agreement, or
provision thereof, by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind, except as provided in this Section, shall
be null and void." Sections (B) through (C) and (E) through (G) of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:921 are the exclusive exceptions to Louisiana's prohibition
against covenants not to compete. See, e.g., Team Envt'l Servs., Inc. v. Addison,
2 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he first subsection proclaims that every
agreement not to compete shall be null and void, except for those explicitly
sheltered.").
8. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. 808 So. 2d 294.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 56-79, for a discussion of the SWA T24
opinion.
12. SWAT24, 808 So. 2d at 306.
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to the Statute (the "Amendment"). 13 The Amendment provides that
a person who becomes employed by a competing business "may be
deemed to be carrying on or engaging in a business" similar to that of
his former employer.
The Amendment's application is uncertain and potentially
troublesome. Without question, SWAT 24 severely restricted the
ability of Louisiana employers to enforce noncompete agreements;
the Amendment reflects the legislature's intention to correct the
perceived imbalance effected by that decision. 5 However, the
Amendment, rather than achieving equilibrium, has simply reversed
the imbalance. By its terms, the Amendment allows employers to
prevent former employees from accepting all employment positions
with competitors, although, in many situations, no legitimate business
interest justifying such restraint can be identified. Thus, in the wake
of the most recent addition to Louisiana's ongoing
employer/employee power struggle, unfinished business remains.
This comment seeks to equip Louisiana courts with a framework
for equalizing the competing tensions associated with former
employee competition. The approach offered is currently followed by
the majority of other jurisdictions, 6 and provides a tried and true
method for achieving the necessary balance. Because noncompetition
agreements exist to shield employers from the disadvantages arising
from the possibility that employees will appropriate valuable trade
information and customer relationships upon termination or voluntary
separation, enforcement should be conditioned on the presence of a
legitimate business interest in need of protection. An overwhelming
number of states subscribe to that qualification, 7 and Louisiana
courts should mandate the same when applying the Amendment.
Such restrictive enforcement is consistent with the just legislative
intent underlying its passage, and rectifies the Amendment's potential
for inequitable application.
Part I provides a historical review of Louisiana law on
noncompete agreements, presents the appellate decisions abrogated
by the SWAT 24 court, and examines the SWAT 24 decision. This
section traces the volatile evolution of the law concerning
noncompetition agreements so that the Amendment may be
understood in its proper context. Against this backdrop, the
13. 2003 La. Acts No. 428, § 1 (codified at La. R.S. 23:921(D) (effective
August 15, 2003)).
14. Id.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 82-104, for a discussion of the
Amendment's legislative history.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 141-58, for a discussion of the majority
approach, which has been termed the legitimate business interest requirement.
17. Id.
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Amendment and its implications are set forth in Part II. During this
discussion, particular focus is devoted to the broad discretion that the
Amendment vests in thejudiciary, and the divergent applications that
the Amendment may receive in light of the legislature's failure to
provide clear standards for its application. Part III identifies two
possible judicial responses to the challenges posed by the
Amendment. Because the two approaches offered in this section are,
for the most part, mutually exclusive, they are best understood as an
either/or proposal: Either revive and reinvigorate the pre-SWAT 24
decisions that sought to balance the competing interests at stake, or
integrate the legitimate business interest requirement as a means of
avoiding an inequitable or absurd result. Although the pre-SWAT24
appellate decisions interpreting "carrying on or engaging in a
business"' 8 could be revived, unlike the legitimate business interest
requirement, they fail to both satisfactorily protect employers'
justifiable concerns and implement the legislature's equitable
intentions underlying the Amendment. Hence, it is submitted that
Louisiana courts should endeavor to balance the competing tensions
produced by former employee competition with reference to the
universally accepted latter approach. Where legitimate business
interests that have historically been protected by a noncompete
agreement are at stake, logic and equity demand enforcement. Yet
where no such interest may be ascertained or justified, individual
autonomy and considerations of sound public policy tip the scales in
favor of employee freedom.
I. BACKGROUND: LOUISIANA'S EMPLOYMENT POWER STRUGGLES
The evolution of Louisiana's noncompetition law demonstrates
not only a clash between the competing interests of individuals and
businesses, but also a clash of public policies and interpretive
philosophies. The following sections address the highlights in the
development of the law regarding noncompete agreements in order to
better understand the legislature's most recent addition to the power
struggle.
A. Historical Summary of Louisiana Statutory Law on
Noncompetition Agreements
In 1934 the Louisiana legislature first articulated the state's policy
as it related to noncompete agreements.' 9 Act No. 133 of 1934
18. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
19. SWAT24, 808 So. 2d at 303. See Carey C. Lyon, Comment, Oppress the
Employee: Louisiana's Approach to Noncompetition Agreements, 61 La. L. Rev.
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nullified "contracts [where employees agree] not to engage in any
competing business for themselves or as the employee of another
upon the termination of their contract with such employer."2 Yet in
1962, and again in 1989, the legislature significantly altered
Louisiana law by amending the pertinent statute to permit
noncompetition agreements under certain conditions. As one
commentator has suggested, it is likely that these alterations resulted
from market pressures and successful lobbying by businesses.2'
1. The 1962 Amendment and Its Judicial Gloss
The 1962 amendment generally prohibited noncompetition
agreements, providing that contracts where "the employee agrees not
to engage in any competing business for himself, or as the employee
of another" are null and void.22 However, as an exception to this rule,
the law in 1962 also provided that a noncompete agreement
prohibiting an employee from "enter[ing] into the same business that
[the] employer is engaged over the same route or in the same territory
for a period of two (2) years" was valid and enforceable if the
employer had incurred advertising or employee training expenses.23
Thus, Louisiana law sought to protect employers who expended
advertising and training dollars by enforcing noncompetition
agreements for this limited purpose.24
Twelve years later the Louisiana Supreme Court abrogated the
limited protections afforded to employers under the 1962 amendment.
In Orkin Exterminating Company v. Foti,2" the court narrowly
interpreted the statute to hold that advertising or employee training
expenses must be substantial in order for noncompete agreements to
be enforceable. 6 Essentially, the Orkin court superimposed a
flexible, subjective analysis on the face of the statute. As a result,
Louisiana courts post-Orkin did not enforce noncompetition
agreements under the plain language of the statute, relying instead on
the supreme court's restrictive construction.27
605, 612-14 (2001), for an insightful discussion of the evolution of Louisiana law
regarding noncompetition agreements.
20. SWAT24, 808 So. 2d at 303 (quoting repealed Act No. 133 of 1934).
21. Lyon, supra note 19, at 607.
22. SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 303 (quoting repealed La. R.S. 23:921 (1962)).
23. Id. at 304.
24. Id. ("The purpose of this amendment was 'to protect an employer only
where he has invested substantial sums in special training of the employee or in
advertising the employee's connection with his business.") (quoting Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 597 (La. 1974)).
25. 302 So. 2d 593.
26. Id. at 597.
27. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 19, at 613 ("[N]o court considering the
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2. The 1989 Amendment: Predictability Becomes Paramount
In 1989 the legislature again revised Louisiana's noncompetition
law by repealing the 1962 amendment and rewriting the statute. The
new Statute retains a general prohibition against noncompete
agreements, 28 with one major employer/employee exception:
Any ... employee may agree with his employer to refrain
from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of
the employer and/or from soliciting customers of the
employer within a specified parish or parishes, municipality
or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer
carries on a like business therein, not to exceed a period of
two years from termination of employment.29
This exception, found in Section C of the Statute, departs from the
1962 amendment's focus on advertising and training expenses.
Likewise, Section C does not empower courts with a flexible,
subjective analysis for testing the validity of noncompetition
agreements. Instead, Section C provides objective criteria that afford
parties a degree of predictability. If an employer drafts its
noncompete agreement in such a way that it "mechanically adheres"
to Section C's yardstick, then enforceability is virtually certain, and
the employer should be able to obtain injunctive relief against a
competing former employee.3 ° Yet as the following sections
demonstrate, the extent to which an employer could restrict
competition under Section C remained ambiguous long after its
passage.
enforceability of noncompetition agreements after Orkin found there to be
substantial expense such that a noncompetition agreement could be enforced.");
Jeffery D. Morgan, Comment, If At First You Don't Succeed: Louisiana's Latest
Statutory Enactment Governing Agreements Not to Compete, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 551,
558 (1991) ("[N]o court found the requisite 'substantial expenditures' test to be
satisfied sufficiently to uphold a noncompetition agreement between an employer
and an employee. In effect, the Louisiana Supreme Court had emasculated the 1962
amendment, rendering its exceptions almost meaningless.").
28. La. R.S. 23:921(A) (2002).
29. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
30. See, e.g., Sentilles Optical Servs. v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 395,399 (La. App.
2nd Cir. 1995) (stating that Louisiana law requires "mechanical adherence" to
Section C); Gearheard v. De Puy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 99-1091, 1999 WL
638582 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1999) ("Louisiana's approach to non-competition
agreements requires mechanical adherence to the requirements listed in the law
(especially the geographical and time limitations).") (internal quotations omitted);
Lyon, supra note 19, at 607 ("[C]ourts simply require mechanical adherence to the
statute in order to effect an enforceable agreement.").
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B. SWAT 24's Appellate Predecessors
Prior to the supreme court's decision in SWAT 24, Section C's
phrase, "carrying on or engaging in a business[,]" received conflicting
interpretations in the courts of appeal. The Louisiana Second Circuit
Court of Appeal interpreted the phrase narrowly to mean restraints in
the form of prohibiting a former employee from either engaging in a
separate business venture for himself or accepting an employment
position with a competitor when that position entailed soliciting his
former employer's customers. 3' By contrast, the Louisiana Third and
Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal refused to limit Section C in this
fashion, finding that section satisfied not only in the circumstances
outlined by the second circuit, but also when a former employee
simply worked for his former employer's competitor without regard
to whether his new position entailed solicitation of his former
employer's customers.
1. The Second Circuit's Approach
In Summit Institute for Pulmonary Medicine & Rehabilitation,
Inc. v. Prouty,33 the second circuit invalidated what it found to be an
overbroad noncompetition agreement. The plaintiff, an operator of
long-term, acute care, and physical rehabilitation hospitals, hired the
defendant for a position in its marketing department to recruit
patients. After signing a noncompetition agreement, the defendant
left the plaintiff's employ and accepted a new marketing position with
one of the plaintiffs competitors. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff
employer brought suit, seeking to enjoin the defendant from working
in his new position.
The Summit plaintiff based its action on the covenant not to
compete which prohibited the defendant from becoming an employee
of any entity managing or providing long-term acute medical services
or physical rehabilitation. In determining whether "carrying on or
engaging in a business" encompassed all forms of employment with
a competitor, the Summit court sensibly stated that the decision to
either enforce or invalidate a noncompetition agreement "should
promote a reasonable economic goal." The court reasoned that
31. See, e.g., Summit Inst. for Pulmonary Med. & Rehab., Inc. v. Prouty, 691
So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1997), writ denied, 701 So. 2d 983 (La. 1997).
32. See, e.g., Moreno v. Assoc. v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91, 95 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1999); Scariano, 719 So. 2d at 135 (expressly refusing to follow Summit, 691 So.
2d 1384).
33. 691 So. 2d 1384.
34. Id. at 1386.
35. Id. at 1387.
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precluding a former employee from accepting employment with his
former employer's competitor was unreasonable when his new
position would not have an impact on the former employer.
3 6
Thus, the second circuit held that Section C only permitted the
enforcement of noncompetition agreements that restrained an
individual from either opening a similar competing business or
accepting employment with a competitor of his former employer
where he solicits his former employer's customers." Because the
noncompetition agreement at issue precluded the defendant from
accepting all employment positions with a competitor, it was held
overbroad.38 In sum, the Summit court interpreted "carrying on or
engaging in a business" to mean opening a separate, similar
competing business or accepting a new position that entails the
solicitation of a former employer's customers.39
2. The Third and Fourth Circuits'Approach
One year after Summit, the fourth circuit handed down its own
opinion interpreting Section C. In Scariano Brothers, Inc. v.
Sullivan,40 the plaintiff employer was engaged in the marketing,
distributing, and processing of meat, poultry, and meat related
products. It sought to enjoin the defendant, a former sales
representative, from working for a competing business in the same
position. The noncompetition agreement at issue prevented the
"rendering [of] services to... any other person or entity" engaged in
the employer's business.4' On appeal from the grant of an injunction
at the trial court level, the defendant relied on the Summit decision to
argue that the covenant not to compete was overbroad because it
prevented him from working in any capacity with a competitor of his
former employer.42
The Scariano court agreed with the defendant's contention that
the phrase prohibiting employment in any position with a competitor
was overbroad.43 But, it relied on the agreement's severability clause
to enforce the remainder of the covenant not to compete, which
effectively prevented the employee from working as a sales
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1388.
39. Id. at 1387.
40. 719 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 135.
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representative with the plaintiff's competitor.44 The fourth circuit in
Scariano expressly refused to follow the Summit decision,
characterizing that opinion as "illogical and nonsensical." '45 The
Scariano court held that "carrying on or engaging in a business' ' 6
encompassed agreements that restrained an employee from either
owning a competing business or working for a competitor.47
The third circuit followed the Scariano opinion in Moreno &
Associates v. Black.4  The Moreno plaintiff sued to enforce a
noncompetition agreement against the defendant, its former employee
and safety consultant, who had accepted a position with a competing
business. Like the covenants in Summit and Scariano, the Moreno
noncompetition agreement prevented the defendant from holding any
position with a competitor because it prohibited post-employment
participation with a "[p]erson or business in direct or indirect
competition" with the plaintiff.49
Citing Scariano, the Moreno court reasoned that the agreement's
language could operate to prevent the defendant from engaging in
actions that directly compete with the plaintiff's business, but it could
not prohibit the defendant from holding any position with a
competitor.50 The court held that the noncompete's language
accomplished the former restraint only, and, thus, it complied with
Section C and was enforceable.5'
The approach taken in Scariano and Moreno is markedly different
from the Summit court's interpretation of "carrying on or engaging in
a business."52 Neither Scariano nor Moreno adopted the second
circuit's examination of customer solicitation.53 The Scariano court
failed to explain the reasoning in support of its interpretation of
"carrying on or engaging in a business[,] ' 5 4 and the Moreno court
cited Scariano in support of its conclusion that the former employee's
competing actions were determinative." In light of the confusing
jurisprudence and obvious circuit split, the stage was set for supreme
court intervention.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 134.
46. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
47. Scariano, 719 So. 2d at 135.
48. 741 So. 2d91.
49. Id. at 94.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 95.
52. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
53. Scariano, 719 So. 2d at 134; Moreno & Assoc. v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1999) (failing to recognize the Summit opinion's existence).
54. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
55. Moreno, 741 So. 2d at 94.
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C. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of Louisiana resolved the split among the
circuit courts of appeal in the divided opinion of SWAT24 Shreveport
Bossier, Inc. v. Bond.5 6 In SWAT24, a construction company sought to
restrain its former production manager from securing employment with
a competitor in the same position. The covenant not to compete in
question prevented the defendant from serving as an employee in any
capacity with a business that competed with the plaintiff. The trial
court relied on the Summit decision and denied the employer an
injunction against the defendant." In reviewing the second circuit's
affirmation of the trial court's ruling, the supreme court based its
decision on the legislative intent underlying the 1989 amendment.
5 8
The Court stated that the 1989 amendment (Section C), which
allows agreements to restrain employees from "carrying on or engaging
in a business[,]" 9 changed "the type of business in which an employee
may be allowed to agree not to compete."'6° In addition, the Court
interpreted the state's long-standing policy disfavoring covenants not
to compete as an indication that the language of Section C should be
strictly construed.6 The supreme court concluded that the legislature
intended, with the passage of the 1989 amendment, to provide for the
enforcement of only those covenants not to compete that restrained an
employee from carrying on or engaging in his own similar competing
business. 62
The Court reasoned that Section C's phrase, "and/or from soliciting
customers of the employer[,]" would be rendered meaningless by an
interpretation allowing employers to prohibit former employees from
working for a competitor because "there would be no business for
which to solicit customers." Noncompetition agreements that restrict
a former employee from working for a competitor were deemed outside
of the ambit of Section C and, thus, invalid under the Statute."
Consequently, the Court nullified the SWAT 24 noncompetition
agreement.6
5
56. 808 So. 2d294.
57. Id. at 297.
58. Id. at 305.
59. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
60. SWAT24, 808 So. 2d at 306.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 308 ("The statute does not allow a flat prohibition of employment by
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Consistent with the decisions of its circuit courts of appeal, the
supreme court refused to interpret Section C's "carrying on or
engaging in a business" language to permit noncompetition
agreements that restrain an individual from working in any capacity
with his former employer's competitors." Yet the Court did not
adopt either of the more balanced approaches of Summit or
Scariano, which allowed limited competitive restraint.67 Instead,
the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on legislative intent to
completely negate the protection of employer interests through
noncompetition agreements that prevented a former employee from
securing employment with competitors.
2. Justice Traylor 's Dissent
In a stinging dissent joined by two otherjustices, Justice Traylor
wrote that "the [SWAT 24] majority's interpretation strangles the
statute, and . . . renders noncompetition agreements effectively
meaningless between an employer and his employee. 6 1 Justice
Traylor's dissent rested on three grounds. First, the dictionary
definition of "engage" covers an employee engaged in the employ
of another.69 Justice Traylor reasoned that an interpretation of
Section C that allowed an employee to agree to refrain from
engaging in the employ of a competitor would not render the phrase
"and/or soliciting customers of the employer" meaningless because
employees are not the only means an employer may use to solicit
customers.70
Second, Justice Traylor attacked the majority's conclusion that
the legislative intent underlying the 1989 amendment was to restrict
the enforceability of noncompetition agreements. 7' He contended
that the "carrying on or engaging in a business"72 phrase added by
the 1989 amendment is broader than the 1962 amendment's
language that nullified agreements restraining individuals from
"engag[ing] in any competing business for himself, or as the
a competitor, even if the employee's new job duties are exactly the same as those
performed for the former employer.").
66. Id. at 307.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 33-47, for a discussion of these
decisions.
68. SWAT24, 808 So. 2d at 312 (Traylor, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 751 (4th ed.
1976)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 312-13.
72. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
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employee of another. 73 Thus, the dissent concluded that the legislature
actually intended, in 1989, to broaden the statutory exceptions to the
general rule of nullity, a legislative judgment directly contravened by
the SWAT 24 majority.7 4
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority for failing to take into
account the important employer interests served by noncompetition
agreements. Justice Traylor wrote that noncompetition agreements
serve to protect employers from the competitive disadvantages
resulting from employee exploitation of acquired skills, knowledge,
and information. He viewed noncompetition agreements as
mechanisms for simultaneously preserving competitive advantages and
protecting important employer interests.
The dissent characterized the majority's decision as an unnecessary
paternalistic intervention to preserve the archaic principle of individual
freedom and to protect the "downtrodden" employee at the expense of
legitimate employer interests, common business practices, and
legislative intent.77 Justice Traylor recommended an alternative
approach, one which he maintained would further the intent of the
legislature while balancing the interests of both employers and
employees.78 He suggested that the contract language, the competitive
status of the employers, and the employee's new position and its impact
on his former employer should all be considered when determining
whether to enforce the agreement in question.79 Justice Traylor's view
of the legislature's intent proved prophetic just two years later when the
Statute was, yet again, amended.
II. THE AMENDMENT: HONORABLE INTENTIONS WITH A GRIEvOuS
POTENTIALITY
A. The Well-Meaning Legislature
The most recent amendment to the noncompetition statute was
signed by Governor Murphy James "Mike" Foster, Jr. on June 18,
2003 and took effect on August 15, 2003.80 The Amendment adds the
following section to the Statute:
73. SWAT24, 808 So. 2d at 313 (Traylor, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Id. at315.
76. Id. at 314.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 2003 La. Acts No. 428, History-HB 1770, available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/leg_docs/O3RS/CVT2/OUT/HOO10288.PDF (last
downloaded Jan. 17, 2004).
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For the purposes of Subsections B and C, a person who
becomes employed by a competing business, regardless of
whether or not that person is an owner or equity interest
holder of that competing business, may be deemed to be
carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the
party having a contractual right to prevent that person from
competing.
After the Amendment's enactment, Section C's phrase, "carrying on
or engaging in a business[,]" no longer has the meaning assigned to
it by the supreme court in SWAT 24. That language may now be
interpreted to enforce a covenant not to compete that prevents an
individual from securing employment with competitors of his former
employer. Thus, the Amendment overrules the restrictive statutory
construction adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in SWAT 24.
The sentiments underlying this legislative response are the subject of
the following sections.
1. The Committee Meeting
Representative Jack D. Smith introduced the Amendment in its
original form at an April 30, 2003 meeting of the Louisiana House of
Representatives Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations.82 In
his presentation, Representative Smith stressed that the Amendment
was not a Louisiana Association of Business and Industry ("LABr')
bill, but rather it was conceived out of the unfairness experienced by
a Louisiana computer company (hypothetically named "Audubon")."
Representative Smith explained that Audubon hired an individual
as its Executive Vice President in charge of sales (hypothetically
named "Joe"), and it agreed to pay him "a couple hundred wand a
year" as well as an initial distribution of Audubon stock. Joe
thereafter signed a noncompetition agreement. About one year later,
Audubon had to terminate Joe because he had "a very serious
problem" that the company board felt would trigger employee
81. 2003 La. Acts No. 428, § 1. As of January 20, 2004, only two reported
decisions recognized the Amendment's existence. In Sola Communications, Inc.
v. Bailey, 861 So. 2d 822, 827-28 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2003) and Hose Specialty &
Supply Management Co., Inc. v. Guccione, 865 So. 2d 183, 195 n.1 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 2003), the Louisiana Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal refused to
retroactively apply the Amendment.
82. Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations, La. House of
Representatives, 2003 Reg. Sess., April 30, 2003, Audio-Video file, available at
http://house.legis.state.la.us/rniarchive/RanIRaniApr03/Llapr30.ram [hereinafter
"Audio-Video File"] (last downloaded Jan. 17, 2004).
83. Id.
84. Id.
[Vol. 64
lawsuits if he remained an Audubon employee.8" Upon discharge, the
company gave Joe the option to either retain the stock or exchange it
for cash. Joe chose the latter. After his termination, Joe told
Audubon, "Hey, I got your cash and I'm out of this noncompete and
I'm going down the street and I'm going to take my client list that you
gave me and all of the materials that you gave me and now I'm going
to compete against you." 6 Following this narrative, Representative
Smith emphasized that the Amendment was aimed at correcting the
inequity resulting from Audubon's inability to enforce the
noncompetition agreement against Joe under Louisiana law. 7 He
described the Amendment's effect as follows: "We say No, No Joe.
We're not going to do that."88
In the ensuing dialogue, Representatives Henry "Tank" Powell and
A. G. Crowe communicated their concern over the Amendment's effect
on employees' right to work. Representative Smith responded by
stating, "I think what this bill tries to do is clarify in the law it should
be fairness, not only to the employee, but also to the employer.
89
Representative Smith continued, "When you bring in a guy and you pay
him a lot of money and give him stock and for whatever reason he's got
to go and you think you've got a noncompete there and just because he
takes the cash for the stock .... 90
Representative Shirley Bowler addressed Representative Smith's
recurring emphasis on the fact that Joe elected to receive cash for his
Audubon stock. She stated that the Amendment's equity interest
language refers to the former employee's "position with the new
employer not with the old employer."' Failing to understand her
point, Representative Smith later stated that, had Joe remained an
Audubon stockholder, "the noncompete would have been enforced. 9 2
Representative Bowler also astutely pointed out that in a recent
supreme court decision, unmistakably the SWAT 24 case, the Court
refused to enforce a noncompetition agreement that restrained an
individual from accepting employment with a competitor of his
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Representative Smith continued his remarks addressed to the
hypothetical employee, "You sign[ed] a noncompete, especially when you take the
cash for the stock." Id. Representative Bowler ultimately, albeit unsuccessfully,
attempted to address Representative Smith's misplaced reliance on the employee's
choice to redeem the stock. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92. Yet these
statements illustrate a general misunderstanding of Louisiana law regarding
noncompetition agreements. See also, text accompanying note 107.
89. Audio-Video File, supra note 82.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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former employer.93 She was troubled that the Amendment was in
conflict with the Court's decision and stated, "I'm afraid if we adopt
this bill, all we're doing is . . . basically kind of flailing about
here."94
Representative Loulan J. Pitre, Jr. confirmed Representative
Bowler's observation regarding SWAT 24 and informed the
committee that he thought the Amendment was narrowly attempting
to correct the supreme court decision, but was not seeking to upset
the balance between employer rights and employee freedom." He
expressed a desire to have "a little more information and
background on the supreme court decision we're trying to correct, ,96
but Representative Smith stated, "I'm not sure about the supreme
court case." 97
After all committee representatives were given an opportunity
to speak, two witnesses testified before the committee. First, Mr.
Jim Patterson of the LABI provided the committee details about the
SWAT 24 decision.98 He argued that the authors of Section C did
not intend the result reached by the supreme court in SWAT24, and
stated that "the fact of the matter is that this type of provision exists
in states all over the south, all of them, either by jurisprudential
precedent or doctrine or by actual statute." 99 Second, Ms. Sibal
Holt, of the Louisiana AFL-CIO, opposed the Amendment.l1° She
was concerned with the scope of the Amendment and its potential
for broad and devastating effects on employees despite the fact that
it was "well intended." '  Ms. Holt articulated her concern by
stating, "You just don't own people when they work for you."102
Ultimately, the Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations
reported the Amendment favorably with eight representatives in
favor and four representatives opposed.' 3  Subsequently, the
Louisiana House of Representatives passed the Amendment by a
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The AFL-CIO is a federation of America's labor unions. See AFL-CIO
website, available at http://www.aflcio.com/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
101. Audio-Video File, supra note 82.
102. Id.
103. Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations, La. House of
Representatives, 2003 Reg. Sess., April 30, 2003, Minutes (on file with the
Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations) ("Representatives E. Alexander,
Crowe, Nevers, Odinet, Pitre, Scalise, Stelly, and Guillory voted yea, and
Representatives Bowler, Murray, Powell, and Tucker voted nay.").
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vote of ninety to thirteen, and the Louisiana Senate passed it as well
with only one opposing vote.'0
2. Sausage and Law
The committee meeting gives credence to the quote, "If you like
laws and sausages, you should never watch either one being
made."' 5 The representatives favorably reported the Amendment
despite their failure to examine a multitude of significant issues.
Consequently, certain conclusions cannot be drawn. It would be
pure conjecture to declare that the Amendment represents an
adoption of Justice Traylor's dissent, as the committee did not even
recognize the dissenting opinion's existence. Also, the committee
did not discuss the pre-SWAT24 appellate decisions interpreting the
language, "carrying on or engaging in a business' ' 6 Thus, the
Amendment's legislative history does not support an argument that
the Amendment adopts either of the approaches abrogated by SWAT
24. But the committee's benightedness extends beyond its
omissions.
The representatives' expressions fail to evidence an
understanding of the progression of Louisiana law regarding
noncompetition agreements. In fact, Representative Smith
misunderstood his own bill, believing that his hypothetical
employee's choice to redeem the stock for cash precluded
enforcement of the noncompete agreement. 0 7 Furthermore, it is
disturbing that a party whose interests are clearly at issue would be
the committee's sole source of information concerning the state of
the law. It would seem that a more appropriate source of legal
authority could have been found in any number of independent legal
experts conveniently located at two state-funded law schools within
twenty-five miles of the legislature. The Amendment represents a
significant change to Louisiana's law governing noncompete
agreements; thus, the committee decision of whether to report it
favorably should have been based on the knowledgeable input of
numerous authorities representing diverse and disinterested parties.
104. 2003 La. Acts No. 428, History-HB 1770, available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/leg_docs/O3RS/CVT2/OUT/HO010288.PDF (last
downloaded Jan. 17, 2004). Senator Robert "Rob" Marionneaux, Jr. was the lone
opposing vote in the Louisiana Senate. See 2003 La. Acts No. 428, S Vote HB
1770, FINAL PASSAGE, available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/legdocs/03RS/CVT2/OUT/OOOOKLZO.PDF.
105. Otto von Bismarck, in Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations
Requested from the Congressional Research Service 190 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
106. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
107. See supra note 88 and text accompanying notes 90-92.
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Despite the committee's unawareness, two observations can be
made. First, the committee favorably reported the Amendment after
noting its contradiction of SWAT 24. Second, the representatives
reported the Amendment favorably after multiple statements were
made that the Amendment provided fairness to both employers and
employees. At the meeting's conclusion, Representative Smith
summarized the intention behind the Amendment and stated that
noncompetition agreements exist to protect employers' interests in
confidential information, in customer lists, and in proprietary
information.'0 8 Thus, it appears likely that the committee intended to
overrule the SWAT 24 decision to favor employer rotection and the
equitable enforcement ofnoncompete agreements.' Nevertheless, the
ambiguities inherent in the Amendment's language may thwart this
equitable purpose by unnecessarily exposing employees to overly
restrictive covenants not to compete. The particular dangers created by
the new enactment are examined in the following section.
B. The Danger to Employee Liberty
The Amendment does not define the phrase "carrying on or
engaging in a business."110 Rather, the Amendment permits the
judiciary to deem a person who is employed by his former employer's
competitor to be "carrying on or engaging in a business.""' The most
obvious result of this change is that certain covenants not to compete
that restrain an individual from accepting employment with
competitors of his former employer may now be deemed enforceable.
The Amendment expressly allows the judiciary to enforce covenants
not to compete that restrain an individual from accepting employment
with competitors of his former employer upon termination or voluntary
separation.
Significantly, however, the Amendment does not require such
enforcement because the permissive word "may" is used."2 According
to its terms, simple mechanical adherence to the amended Statute's
requirements does not automatically constitute enforcement against a
former employee in a competitor's employ. Such a spurious
108. Audio-Video File, supra note 82.
109. See Sola Communications, Inc. v. Bailey, 861 So. 2d 822,827-28 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2003) ("The subsequent amendment was clearly in the nature of a
substantive change to the law as it existed after the supreme court's pronouncement
in SWA T24. This type of response to a supreme court determination cannot be said
to be merely interpretive, but must be viewed as substantive insofar as it establishes
a new rule.").
110. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
111. 2003 La. Acts No. 428, § 1.
112. Id. ("[A] person who becomes employed by a competing business... may
be deemed to be carrying on or engaging in a business ... ") (emphasis added).
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interpretation would effectively rewrite the Amendment to read: "[A]
person who becomes employed by a competing business... [shall] be
deemed to be carrying on or engaging in a business .... ." Automatic
enforcement ofnoncompetition agreements misreads the plain language
of the Amendment and ignores the broad discretion granted to the
judiciary.
Discretionary terms notwithstanding, the danger ofthe Amendment
lies in its failure to textually provide standards for its application.
Given this uncertainty, the Amendment has the potential to subsume
cases where the former employee does not even perform activities with
a competing employer that overlap with the particular aspect of his
prior employment. More importantly, because the Amendment lacks
standards for application, courts may apply the Amendment without
identifying any legitimate business interest in need of protection." 3
Hence, the Amendment may be applied to unreasonably preclude an
individual from exercising his trade or earning a living.
The appellate courts in the pre-SWAT 24 decisions refused to
interpret the Statute as a wholesale prohibition against competitive
employment. 4 In addition, the supreme court in SWAT 24 denied the
plaintiff employer's contention that the Statute expansively allowed an
employer to restrain a former employee from accepting all employment
positions with a competitor."' Thus, the Amendment's potential
application squarely contradicts all prior jurisprudential authority in
Louisiana regarding the extent of permissible competitive restraints
under these Statutes.
113. Such interpretation appears more likely considering the supreme court's
reasoning in SWA T24 that "[t]he language of the original exceptions [to the Statute]
themselves has not been expanded, thus solidifying the notion that the public policy
disfavoring such agreements remain strong." SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 305. The
Amendment is undoubtedly an expansion which may be interpreted to shift
Louisiana's public policy. Thus, a post-Amendment noncompetition agreement
might be held valid even though it precludes a former employee from accepting any
employment position with a competitor.
114. See Summit Inst. for Pulmonary Med. &Rehab., Inc. v. Prouty, 691 So. 2d
1384, 1387 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1997); Scariano Bros., Inc. v. Sullivan, 719 So. 2d
135 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998); Moreno & Assoc. v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91, 94 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1999).
115. SWAT24, 808So.2dat307:
If the statute were to allow an employer to enter into an agreement
whereby an employee agrees to refrain from being employed by a
competitor subject to certain geographical restrictions, then, for example,
a doctor employed by a regional hospital who signs such an agreement
could not practice medicine in any capacity in the region for two years.
The same situation would result if a riverboat pilot, a plumber, or a bank
manager signed a noncompetition agreement. Such results would curtail
employees' ability to earn a living and offend the basic premise of
Louisiana's doctrine of employment at will. These overbroad and
expansive results could not have been intended by the legislature.
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It is well documented that the legislature intended the
Amendment "to provide fairness to the employee and the
employer."'" 6  Nevertheless, if an employer is successful in
restraining a former employee from accepting all employment
positions with a competitor despite the absence of a legitimate
business interest, then the legislature's intent has been neglected" 7
in favor of indenturing that employee to his current post. ' Such an
employment relationship resembles debt peonage, or compulsory
service in payment of a debt." 9 The employer is effectively saying,
"We don't have to keep you, and you can't rely on us, but we can
keep you from working at your chosen life work."' 20  The
Amendment could, thus, produce overbroad and expansive results
by permitting the enforcement of noncompete agreements that
essentially function as devices in terrorem. The following fact
pattern, taken from an actual case, illustrates the Amendment's
potential for inequity. 22
Faces Boutique was a facial spa company that provided skin
care services. Deborah Gibbs joined the business as an esthetician
and thereafter provided facials to customers of Faces Boutique. She
and her new employer entered into a written employment contract
containing a provision that prevented Deborah Gibbs from securing
employment in any capacity with any competing business providing
facials. After approximately one year at Faces Boutique, Deborah
Gibbs took an eight-day maternity leave. Deborah Gibbs did not
return to Faces Boutique. Instead, she accepted a position as a
116. Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations, La. House of
Representatives, 2003 Reg. Sess., April 30, 2003, Minutes (on file with the
Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations). See also, supra text accompanying
notes 89 and 95.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 89 and 95.
118. Covenants not to compete are subject to "great abuses.., from masters,
who are apt to give their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use
many indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, lest they should prejudice
them in their custom, when they come up to set up for themselves." Mitchel v.
Reynolds, I P. Wins. 181, 190, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Q.B. 1711). See also,
Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining For Loyalty In The Information Age, 80 Or.
L. Rev. 1163, 1176 (2001) (arguing that when an employer has a legitimate
protectable interest, it "is neither attempting to indenture the employee nor restrain
legitimate competition, but rather is seeking to prevent the employee from departing
with the customer base that the employer developed.").
119. Bailey v. State of Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242, 31 S. Ct. 145, 152 (1911)("[Peonage] may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based
upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.").
120. Hendrik Hartog, Stone's Transitions, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 821, 823 (2002).
121. The Latin phrase in terrorem is defined as "[b]y way of threat" or "as a
warning." Black's Law Dictionary 825 (7th ed. 1999).
122. See Faces Boutique, Ltd. v. Gibbs, 455 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
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manicurist with a nearby beauty salon that happened to also provide
facials to its customers.
If Faces Boutique files suit, a Louisiana court applying the
Amendment could deem Deborah Gibbs' employment with Faces
Boutique's competitor to constitute "carrying on or engaging in a
business" within the meaning of Section C. Assuming the covenant
not to compete complies with Section C's remaining technical
requirements, Faces Boutique would be able to obtain an injunction
against Deborah Gibbs that would prevent her from either continuing
in her new manicurist position or "working as... [the] competitor's
janitor. ,123 By its express terms, the Statute does not require further
analysis. Yet equity hinges on one unanswered issue: does Faces
Boutique have a protectable legitimate business interest that
outweighs Deborah Gibbs' individual freedom? In light of the
discretionary wording of the Amendment, it would seem that the
legislature has left the task of shaping Louisiana policy, as it relates
to competitive restraints, largely to the courts. The following section
outlines two potential judicial reactions to this broad grant of
discretionary authority.
III. TENABLE JUDICIAL RESPONSES
In spite of the legislature's intention to provide fairness to both
employers and employees, the Amendment could radically shift the
anti-competition versus individual freedom balance in favor of
employers. It therefore becomes necessary to develop an application
of the Amendment that balances employer interests against employee
freedom. This section analyzes two alternative courses the judiciary
may take when applying the Amendment.
A. Reviving Pre-SWAT 24 Decisions
As noted previously, the SWAT 24 decision resolved a split
among the decisions of the Louisiana circuit courts of appeal, each of
which allowed limited restrictions on former employee competition
under different rationales. 2 4 The Amendment overrules the SWA T24
decision. Consequently, the pre-SWAT 24 appellate decisions may
guide the judiciary and provide a proper standard, the satisfaction of
which would warrant the Amendment's permissive enforcement.
123. Telxon Corp. v. Hoffman, 720 F. Supp. 657, 664 (N.D. Ill. 1989). In
Telxon, the court invalidated a covenant not to compete because it did "not preclude
employment only in those capacities which might threaten [the employer's]...
legitimate interests." Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55, for a discussion of the major
appellate court decisions leading up to SWAT 24.
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The second circuit's analysis in Summit Institute for Pulmonary
Medicine & Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Prouty'25 implies that it is unjust
and inequitable to restrain an employee with a covenant -not to
compete when his former employer does not have a legitimate
business interest in need of protection. Unfortunately, the court held
that customer solicitation is the only employer interest worthy of
protection. 2 6 The Amendment's history manifests a legislative
recognition of multiple employer interests, including confidential
information, customer lists, and proprietary information. 127 And there
are, in fact, multiple employer interests that should find refuge behind
a noncompetition agreement's shield.2 8 The Summit approach is
therefore too narrow, failing to both adequately protect employer
interests and provide guidance consistent with the legislature's will.
In Scariano Brothers, Incorporated v. Sullivan,19 the fourth
circuit found that the agreement at issue was overbroad because it
prevented the individual from "rendering services" to a former
employer's competitor. 3 The court's reasoning is unclear. The
fourth circuit merely stated that the competitive actions encompassed
by the covenant did not constitute "carrying on or engaging in a
business"'' similar to the plaintiff employer12 Thus, the court
recognized that working for a competitor of a former employer is,
without more, not "carrying on or engaging in a business."13
According to the fourth circuit, the former employee's new position
must constitute "carrying on or engaging in a business"'34 similar to
that of his former employer.' By focusing solely on the former
employee's new position, the Scariano court did not explicitly
balance the employer's interests against the employee's freedom.
The Scariano court's approach could be interpreted in two ways.
First, if the former employee's new position entails competing with
any aspect of his former employer's business, then the employee is
"carrying on or engaging in a business"'13 6 similar to his former
employer. This interpretation was adopted by the third circuit in
Moreno & Associates v. Black. '37 A comparable approach focusing on
125. 691 So. 2d 1384.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
127. See supra text accompanying note 108.
128. See infra text accompany note 154.
129. 719 So. 2d 131.
130. Id. at 135.
131. La. R.S. 23.:921(C) (2002).
132. Scariano, 719 So. 2d at 135.
133. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
134. Id.
135. Scariano, 719 So. 2d at 135.
136. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
137. 741 So. 2d91.
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the former employee's new position and its impact on the former
employer was suggested by Justice Traylor in his SWA T24 dissent.' 8
By strictly focusing on competition, this first interpretation of the
Scariano opinion forecloses an inquiry into the parties' respective
interests. Fair competition is highly favored, and competitive
restrictions cannot reasonably be based solely on the employer's
desire to contractually eliminate competition."' Only a legitimate
business interest in need of protection warrants a restraint on an
individual's freedom. 40 Thus, this first interpretation of the Scariano
opinion fails to resolve the Amendment's potential for unjust
application.
Second, the Scariano court's intention may have been to
formulate a rule that allows a noncompete agreement to prevent a
former employee from assuming a new position where the activities
he performs overlap with the particular aspect of business that he
performed for his former employer. However, this view assumes that
the employer has a legitimate business interest in need of protection.
The fourth circuit did not explain the scope or application of its rule,
and both interpretations of its rationale are problematic. Thus, the
Scariano decision does not provide an appropriate formula for the
Amendment's application.
In sum, the pre-SWAT 24 decisions of the Louisiana circuit
courts of appeal do not provide an adequate analysis for determining
the scope of the Amendment's application in a way that conforms
with the legislature's equitable intentions. The second circuit too
narrowly restricted the employer's legitimate business interests to
include only customer solicitation, while the third and fourth
138. See supra text accompanying note 79.
139. See, e.g., Davis v. Albany Area Primary Health Care, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 909,
912 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the "avoidance of competition is not a
legitimate business interest sufficient to justify such an uncertain geographic
limitation. . . ."); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 368 (N.Y. 1987)
("Underlying the strict approach to enforcement of these covenants is the notion
that, once the term of an employment agreement has expired, the general public
policy favoring robust and uninhibited competition should not give way merely
because a particular employer wishes to insulate himself from competition."); Hasty
v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471,473 (Tenn. 1984) ("[A]ny competition by
a former employee may well injure the business of the employer. An employer,
however, cannot by contract restrain ordinary competition."); Lester, supra note 3,
at 54 (stating that noncompete agreements "interfere with market competition" and
thus are only enforceable if they protect "a 'legitimate interest' of the employer..
. ."); Amow-Richman, supra note 118, at 1175 ("Employers have no right to
enforce a noncompete merely for purposes of indenturing an employee to his or her
current post, nor any right to prevent competition per se. To avoid unfair effects on
employees and competitors, courts require the presence of special interests or
circumstances that justify a restriction.").
140. Id.
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circuits completely failed to evaluate the employers' respective
interests. Despite their potential reinstatement as good law, these
decisions do not further the goals of equity. Consequently,
Louisiana courts seeking to implement the legislature's equitable
intentions should not look to these decisions when construing the
Amendment. Nonetheless, the consensus of other states construing
similar statutes may serve as a highly useful interpretive aid in this
process.
B. The Legitimate Business Interest Requirement: A Proven
Model
If the purpose of noncompetition agreements is to protect
employers' justifiable interests, then it is logical to require the
presence of a legitimate business interest in need of protection as a
prerequisite to enforcement. The overwhelming majority of states
employ this approach. In order for Louisiana tojoin its sister states,
the legitimate business interest standard must first be adopted; and
second, its scope must be defined.
1. The National Standard and Its Definition
Deborah Gibbs, the subject of the facial spa company
employment example outlined in Part 1(B) of this comment, was
fortunate that her case was not adjudicated in a Louisiana court
applying the Amendment without standards. In Faces Boutique,
Ltd. v. Gibbs,14 ' a South Carolina appellate court upheld the trial
court's ruling invalidating the noncompetition agreement. The
appellate court focused on the legitimate business interest
requirement and reasoned that the covenant, by restricting Gibbs
from being associated in any capacity with a competing provider of
facials, exceeded what was necessary to protect the plaintiff
employer's goodwill or customer list.
South Carolina is not the only state requiring a legitimate
business interest. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently stated
that "an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions ... require, at a
minimum, that.. . [noncompetition] contracts be reasonably related
to the protection of a legitimate business interest.' ' 43 Specifically,
the laws of forty-nine states and the District of Columbia demand
that employers prove a legitimate business interest before a
141. 455 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
142. Id. at 709.
143. Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc., 808 A.2d 912, 918 (Pa. 2002).
722 [Vol. 64
2004] NOTES 723
covenant not to compete is enforced.'44 Louisiana is, thus, alone in
its failure to recognize the legitimate business interest standard.
Louisiana's current law does not recognize the legitimate business
interest requirement. The repealed 1962 amendment 5 and the
overruled Summit Institutefor Pulmonary Medicine & Rehabilitation,
144. See, e.g., DeVoe v. Cheatham, 413 So. 2d at 1141 (Ala. 1982); Metcalfe
Invs., Inc. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996); Bed Mart, Inc. v. Kelley, 45
P.3d 1219 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Statco Wireless, L.L.C. v. Southwestern Bell
Wireless, L.L.C., 95 S.W.3d 13 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); Latona v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Am. Exp. Fin.
Advisors, Inc. v. Topel, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Colo. 1999); Aetna Ret. Servs.,
Inc. v. Hug, 1997 WL 396212 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 1997); Singh v. Batta
Envt'l Assocs., Inc., No. 19627, 2003 WL 21309115 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2003);
Deutsch v. Barsky, 795 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2002); Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667
So. 2d 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Riddle v. Geo-Hydro Eng'rs, Inc., 561
S.E.2d 456 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d 163 (Haw.
1976); Pinnacle Performance, Inc. v. Hessing, 17 P.3d 308 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001);
Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Pathfinder
Communications Corp. v. Macy,795 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); AMPC,
Inc. v. Meyer, 669 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003); Varney Bus. Servs., Inc. v.
Pottroff, 59 P.3d 1003 (Kan. 2002); Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram
Assoc., Inc., 622 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Chapman & Drake v.
Harrington, 545 A.2d 645 (Me. 1988); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 464 A.2d 1104
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481 (Mass.
1974); Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Maleki, 765 F.Supp. 402 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Webb
Publ'g. Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Empiregas, Inc.
v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1992); Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964
S.W.2d 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford,
MacDonald & Olson, 708 P.2d 577 (Mont. 1985); Mertz v. Pharmacists Mut. Ins.
Co., 625 N.W.2d 197 (Neb. 2001); Jones v. Deeter, 913 P.2d 1272 (Nev. 1996);
Concord Orthopaedics Prof 1 Assoc. v. Forbes, 702 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1997); Maw
v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc., 820 A.2d 105 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003); Manuel Lujan Ins., Inc. v. Jordan, 673 P.2d 1306 (N.M. 1983); BDO
Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220 (N.Y. 1999); Electrical South, Inc. v.
Lewis, 385 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Werlinger v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co.,
496 N.W.2d 26 (N.D. 1993); Wilson v. Kreusch, 675 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996); Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 12 P.3d 977 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2000); N. Pacific Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431 (Or. 1976); Hess v.
Hebhard & Co., Inc., 808 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2002); Block v. Vetcor of Warwick,
L.L.C., No. 99-0970,2000 WL 1634784 (R.I. May 19,2000); Faces Boutique, Ltd.
v. Gibbs, 455 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); Central Monitoring Serv., Inc. v.
Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513 (S.D. 1996); Baker v. Hooper, 50 S.W.3d 463 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001); Butler v. Arrow Mirror & Glass, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.
2001); Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 31 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992); Roy's Orthopedic,
Inc. v. Lavigne, 454 A.2d 1242 (Vt. 1982); Motion Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 546
S.E.2d 424 (Va. 2001); Copier Specialists, Inc. v. Gillen, 887 P.2d 919 (Wash. Ct.
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145. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27, for a discussion of the 1962
amendment.
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Inc. v. Prouty146 decision protected certain employer interests, but
both were considerably limited in scope. The legitimate business
interest requirement broadly shelters employers and has never been
entirely recognized under Louisiana law. This is despite the fact
that the noncompetition Statute was based on the Alabama and
Florida statutes, 14' and the legitimate business interest requirement
is central to the laws of both of those states.'48 Louisiana is, thus,
the only state in the United States whose law does not currently
require that the employer prove a legitimate business interest.149
2. Origin and Development of the Legitimate Business
Interest Requirement
The 1831 English opinion of Homer v. Graves5 ' is likely the
first legal decision articulating the business interest requirement. 151
The Homer court analyzed the reasonableness of a covenant not to
compete by examining facts relevant to "whether the restraint is
such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party
in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with
the interests of the public."' 52  The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts continues the Horner rule and provides that a noncompete
agreement is reasonable and, thus, enforceable if it is necessary to
protect an employer's legitimate business interest. 153
The majority of state courts and legislatures catagorize the
following business interests as legitimate and worthy of protection:
146. 691 So. 2d 1384. See also, supra text accompanying notes 33-39
(discussing the Summit decision).
147. See Lyon, supra note 19, at 642 (citing Jeffery D. Morgan, Comment, If
At First You Don't Succeed: Louisiana's Latest Statutory Enactment Governing
Agreements Not to Compete, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 551, 552 (1991)).
148. See Chavers v. Copy Prods. Co., Inc. of Mobile, 519 So. 2d 942,944 (Ala.
1988) (stating that a covenant not to compete must be reasonably related to an
employer's "protectable interest."); Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667 So. 2d 961,
964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("This court has held that the statute authorizes
contracts in restraint of trade only to protect the employer's legitimate business
interest."). It should be noted that the Florida statute upon which the Statute is
based has been repealed. See Lyon, supra note 19, at 645.
149. In Sentilles Optical Servs. v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2nd Cir.
1995), the second circuit compared Louisiana and North Carolina policies
governing noncompete agreements pursuant to a conflicts of laws analysis. The
court stated that North Carolina law required a substantial interest of the employer
before enforcing covenants not to compete, and Louisiana law required "mechanical
adherence" to Section C. Id. at 399.
150. 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
151. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
625, 639 (1960).
152. Id. (quoting Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735,743, 131 Eng. Rep. 284,287).
153. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981).
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trade secrets, confidential customer information, and customer
solicitation (goodwill)." 4 Obviously, if these interests are not
protected, a former employee could take advantage of the access he
had in the course of his former employment to appropriate valuable
trade information and to sabotage customer relationships.' Under
the legitimate business interest analysis, a restrictive covenant should
be enforced if it is designed to protect any of the employer's trade
secrets, the potential misappropriation of which would result in "a
free competitive advantage."' 156 The customer solicitation interest is
154. See generally, supra note 144. See also, Timothy J. Long and James H.
McQuade, Practicing Law Institute, Emp. Law YB. § 18:3.2, at 1044-54 (2003)
(citing case law and detailing legitimate business interests); Arnow-Richman, supra,
note 118, at 1175-78 (same); Christine M. O'Malley, Covenants Not to Compete
in the Massachusetts Hi-tech Industry: Assessing the Need for a Legislative
Solution, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1215, 1222 (1999) (same).
155. Kirstan Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm
Agreements Anticipating Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 889, 899 (1992)
("Noncompetition agreements allow employers to entrust confidential, business
development and client relation information efficiently to specific employees.");
Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10
J. Legal Stud. 93, 96-97 (1981) (arguing that noncompetition agreements "are
necessary in some circumstances to lead to efficient amounts of investment in
human capital."). See also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 cmt. c (1981):
The employer's interest in exacting from his employee a promise not to
compete after termination of the employment is usually explained on the
ground that the employee has acquired either confidential trade
information relating to some process or method or the means to attract
customers away from the employer.... A line must be drawn between the
general skills and knowledge of the trade and information that is peculiar
to the employer's business. If the employer seeks to justify the restraint
on the ground of the employee's knowledge of a process or method, the
confidentiality of that process or method and its technological life may be
critical .... If the employer seeks to justify the restraint on the ground of
the employee's ability to attract customers, the nature, extent and locale
of the employee's contacts with customers are relevant. A restraint is
easier to justify if it is limited to one field of activity among many that are
available to the employee.
156. Stork-Werkspoor Diesel V.V. v. Koek, 534 So. 2d 983,985 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1988). Other Louisiana laws protect legitimate employer interests. See, e.g.,
Louisiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act (codified at La. R.S. 51:1431, et seq.);
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (codified at La.
R.S. 51:1401, et seq.). But a noncompete agreement prevents competition
altogether and, thus, avoids the close questions of fact under alternate causes of
action. See, e.g., SDT Indus., Inc. v. Leeper, 793 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 2nd Cir.
2001) (reversing a jury's finding of fact and refusing to uphold a favorable ruling
on the plaintiff's trade secrets and unfair trade practices claims against its
competitor and former employee). Nevertheless, recognition of the trade secret
interest under the legitimate business interest analysis is consistent with Louisiana's
Uniform Trade Secret's Act. In Koek, the fifth circuit explained the purpose of
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present if the former employee had sufficient contact with customers
such that he could lure them away from his former employer.' 7
Likewise, the confidential information interest exists when the
information acquired by the former employee is useful to competitors
and would unreasonably harm the former employer's business.'58
3. Integration with Louisiana Law
The legitimate business interest requirement provides the
judiciary with a sensible and balanced solution to the Amendment's
problematic potential application. Courts should not, due to a lack of
support in the Amendment's text, be reluctant to implement the
business interest requirement. The Amendment's permissive
language gralts the judiciary the authority to develop standards
governing the enforceability ofnoncompete agreements.r"' When the
word "may" is used in the Louisiana Revised Statutes, it is
"permissive.' 6 "Shall," in contrast, is "mandatoy" '61 The Statuteis replete with the "shall" versus "may" distinction.2 The legislature
did not use the word "shall" when writing the Amendment, but it did
use the word "may." Thus, the Amendment's permissive language
denotes that it is to be applied with discretion.
In light of this discretion, courts should deem "a person who
becomes employed by a competing business.., to be carrying on or
engaging in a business similar to that of the party having a contractual
right to prevent that person from competing" only when the employer
Louisiana's UniformTrade Secrets Act and stated that the prohibitions in the statute
exist "to prevent one person or business from profiting from a trade secret
developed by another, because it would thus be acquiring a free competitive
advantage." 534 So. 2d at 985.
157. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 illus. 6-8.
158. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 illus. 9-10.
159. 2003 La. Acts No. 428, § 1 "[M]ay be deemed to be carrying on or
engaging in a business .... ").
160. See La. R.S. 1:3 (2002) ("The word 'shall' is mandatory and the word
'may' is permissive.").
161. Id.
162. See La. R.S. 23:921(A)(1) (2002) ("Every contract... shall bb null and
void."); La. R.S. 23:921(A)(2) (2002) ("The provisions... shall be null and void
...."); La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002) ("Any person.. . may agree with his employer
.... An independent contractor ... may enter into an agreement.... ."); La. R.S.
23:92 1(E) (2002) ("[T]he partnership and the individual partners... may agree.
. .."); La. R.S. 23:921(F)(1) (2002) ("Parties . . . may agree ... ."); La. R.S.
23:921(F)(1)(a) (2002) ("The franchisor shall .... "); La. R.S. 23:921(F)(1)(b)(2002) ("The franchisee shall...."); La. R.S. 23:921(G)(1) (2002) ("An employee
may .... ."); La. R.S. 23:921(G)(4) (2002) ("'[E]mployee' shall .... "); La. R.S.
23:921 (H) (2002) ("Any agreement.., shall be considered an obligation not to do
... failure to perform may entitle the obligee to recover damages .. ").
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has demonstrated that the noncompetition agreement at issue protects
a legitimate business interest.'63 This would prevent the inequity that
certainly results if, through the Amendment's application, an
employer is allowed to indenture its former employee without regard
to whether the noncompete agreement protects a legitimate business
interest. Furthermore, the legitimate business interest requirement
ensures that the legislature's equitable and balanced intent is
respected.
The legitimate business interest requirement should operate as a
threshold determination. An employer must first prove that it has a
legitimate business interest in restraining a former employee from
working for a competitor. If the employer proves the presence of a
legitimate business interest, then the secondary issue of whether the
noncompetition agreement complies with Section C's remaining
technical requirements must be resolved.'"
Integration of the legitimate business interest requirement is
consistent with the legislative intent underlying the Amendment. The
1962 amendment protected advertising and employee training
expenses, 65 and thus its repeal may signal, to some, that the
legislature implicitly rejected the legitimate business interest
requirement. However, this would be an unwarranted reaction. The
modem formulation of the legitimate business interest requirement
protects multiple employer interests, none of which are advertising or
employee training expenses. 166 Moreover, in the Orkin Exterminating
Company v. Foti16  decision, the supreme court's judicial gloss
severely inhibited employers' use of noncompetition agreements.168
If the legislature wanted to negate those limited employer protections
under the 1962 amendment, then inaction and acquiescence to the
Court's restrictive interpretation would have achieved that result.
The Amendment's history actually suggests that the current
163. 2003 La. Acts No. 428, § 1.
164. This comment does not maintain that integration of the legitimate business
interest requirement alone solves all current problems associated with Louisiana's
law on noncompetition agreements. For example, it is unfortunate that the
legislature assumed that a two-year contract term is always reasonable. See La. R.S.
23:92 1(C) (2002). In contrast, the Restatement (Second) invalidates a noncompete
agreement that restrains an employee for a period of time longer than needed to
protect the employer's legitimate interests. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 188(1)(a).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27, for a discussion of the 1962
amendment.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 150-58, for a discussion of legitimate
protectable business interests.
167. 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1974).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27, for a discussion of the Orkin
court's judicial gloss.
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legislature favors employer protection,169 and this latest enactment
may effectively reinstate the Summit Institute for Pulmonary
Medicine & Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Prouty7 ' decision, which provided
protection to employers by recognizing the customer solicitation
interest.17' Thus, the question of whether the legislature rejected the
legitimate business interest requirement fifteen years ago is more
likely than not answered in the negative.
4. Predictability vs. Flexibility
It should be noted, however, that judicial adoption of the
legitimate business interest requirement merits caution. Such a
course of action would contribute to the historical theme of
uncertainty that surrounds the enforceability of Louisiana noncompete
agreements, and may awaken a legislative reaction similar to that
which followed the Orkin decision in 1989.172 Endorsement of the
legitimate business interest requirement, like the Orkin court's
superimposition, introduces a new hurdle that employers must
overcome beyond Section C's objective criteria. However, there is
a significant difference between Orkin's addition and the legitimate
business interest requirement. Orkin's standard of substantial
expenses was unattainable. The legitimate business interest
requirement is, by contrast, a proven equalizer in forty-nine states and
the District of Columbia. Thus, adoption of the legitimate business
interest requirement actually promotes predictability, thereby
reconciling Louisiana law with that of the rest of the nation. ' 73
Satisfying the business interest requirement involves a subjective
balancing of the parties' respective interests, which lends itself to
flexibility. Consequently, "mechanical adherence"'74 to Section C
169. See supra text accompanying notes 82-104 and 108, for a discussion of the
legislative intent underlying the Amendment.
170. 691 So. 2nd 1384 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 33-39, for a discussion of the Summit
decision.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30, for a discussion of the Orkin
decision and the 1989 amendment.
173. From the national employer's point of view, the legitimate business interest
requirement is more favorable than any other standard for the Amendment's
application because the prevalence of a uniform legal standard produces efficiencies
and predictability. Thus, adoption of the legitimate business interest requirement
theoretically encourages business investment in Louisiana's labor force. It should
be noted that application of the Amendment without standards may also encourage
business investment, but the burden imposed on an individual subject to a wholesale
prohibition against competitive employment significantly outweighs the benefit to
a national employer.
174. Sentilles Optical Servs. v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 395, 399 (La. App. 2nd Cir.
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would no longer guarantee a noncompetition agreement's
enforcement. 7 This sacrifice of predictability does echo Orkin.
Nevertheless, to require a legitimate business interest is to specifically
carry out the discretionary authority and general equitable intent
which lies at the heart of the legislature's most recent Amendment.
Equity is a far nobler goal than predictability.
If the legislature truly desires predictability, it should enact a new
statutory provision that requires employers to demonstrate one of a
list of legitimate business interests as a prerequisite to the
enforcement ofnoncompetition agreements. Florida's current statute
governing noncompetition agreements is a stellar example. It
requires employers to plead and prove the existence of a legitimate
business interest, 76 which is statutorily defined to include one of an
illustrative list of specific interests.' 7 Louisiana's noncompetition
statute was originally patterned after a now repealed Florida statute. '
The Louisiana legislature should, once again, follow Florida's model
and supplement the Amendment appropriately if predictability
remains the primary goal.
CONCLUSION
Striking an appropriate balance between employer interests and
individual freedom should be of paramount concern in Louisiana. The
Amendment was enacted with that goal, but its application may
spawn considerable injustice. If courts deem individuals who become
employed by competing businesses to be "carrying on or engaging in
a business""" similar to their former employers without regard to any
legitimate business interest in need of protection, then a form of debt
peonage has replaced individual autonomy in Louisiana.
There is an obvious reason why the laws of every state other than
Louisiana require that an employer demonstrate a legitimate business
interest as a precondition to the enforcement of a noncompete
agreement. Only legitimate business interests, including trade secrets,
1995).
175. See supra note 30 (providing authority that mechanical adherence equals
enforcement).
176. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 542.335(1)(b) (1997) ("The person seeking enforcement
of a restrictive covenant shall plead and prove the existence of one or more
legitimate business interests justifying the restrictive covenant.").
177. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 542.335(1)(b)(l)-(5) (1997) (including trade secrets;
valuable confidential business or professional information; substantial relationships
with specific, prospective, or existing customers, patients, or clients; customer,
patient, or client goodwill; and extraordinary or specialized training as legitimate
business interests).
178. See supra text accompanying note 147.
179. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (2002).
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confidential customer information, and customer solicitation, justify
limited competitive restraints on individual freedom. Restrictions
without such justification unnecessarily tip the delicate balance.
Hence, an application of the Amendment that fails to require a
legitimate business interest is an inequitable encroachment on
employee independence.
This comment submits that the Amendment presents the State of
Louisiana with an opportunity to join the rest of the nation because it
grants the judiciary authority to balance employer interests and
employee freedom. An individual who becomes employed by a
competing business should only be deemed to be "carrying on or
engaging in a business" ' similar to his former employer if the
employer establishes that the noncompetition agreement at issue
protects a legitimate business interest. Although this proposal
arguably reduces the predictability of the expected outcomes, its
flexibility outweighs the risk of uncertainty that it involves, its
equitable goal recognizes the legislature's intent underlying the
Amendment, and its widespread use offers a proven approach to
strike the delicate balance in Louisiana between employer protection
and individual autonomy.
Daniel S. Terrell*
180. Id.
* I am deeply grateful to Professor Glenn G. Morris, Professor William R.
Corbett, Alexandra G. White, and Alex J. Peragine for the encouragement and
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my wife Chrysta.
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Appendix A
Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 23. Labor and Workers'
Compensation Chapter 9. Miscellaneous Provisions Part II. Contracts
§ 921. Restraint of business prohibited; restraint on forum
prohibited; competing business; contracts against engaging in;
provisions for
A. (1) Every contract or agreement, or provision thereof, by
which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind, except as provided in this
Section, shall be null and void.(2) The provisions of every
employment contract or agreement, or provisions thereof, by
which any foreign or domestic employer or any other person or
entity includes a choice of forum clause or choice of law clause
in an employee's contract of employment or collective
bargaining agreement, or attempts to enforce either a choice of
forum clause or choice of law clause in any civil or
administrative action involving an employee, shall be null and
void except where the choice of forum clause or choice of law
clause is expressly, knowingly, and voluntarily agreed to and
ratified by the employee after the occurrence of the incident
which is the subject of the civil or administrative action.
B. Any person, including a corporation and the individual
shareholders of such corporation, who sells the goodwill of a
business may agree with the buyer that the seller or other
interested party in the transaction, will refrain from carrying on
or engaging in a business similar to the business being sold or
from soliciting customers of the business being sold within a
specified parish or parishes, or municipality or municipalities,
or parts thereof, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving
title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business
therein, not to exceed a period of two years from the date of
sale.
C. Any person, including a corporation and the individual
shareholders of such corporation, who is employed as an agent,
servant, or employee may agree with his employer to refrain
from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the
employer and/or from soliciting customers of the employer
within a specified parish or parishes, municipality or
municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer carries
on a like business therein, not to exceed a period of two years
2004]
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from termination of employment. An independent contractor,
whose work is performed pursuant to a written contract, may
enter into an agreement to refrain from carrying on or engaging
in a business similar to the business of the person with whom
the independent contractor has contracted, on the same basis as
if the independent contractor were an employee, for a period
not to exceed two years from the date of the last work
performed under the written contract.
D. For the purposes of Subsections B and C, a person who
becomes employed by a competing business, regardless of
whether or not that person is an owner or equity interest
holder of that competing business, may be deemed to be
carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the
party having a contractual right to prevent that person from
competing.
E. Upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership,
the partnership and the individual partners, including a
corporation and the individual shareholders if the corporation
is a partner, may agree that none of the partners will carry on
a similar business within the same parish or parishes, or
municipality or municipalities, or within specified parts
thereof, where the partnership business has been transacted,
not to exceed a period of two years from the date of
dissolution.
F. (1) Parties to a franchise may agree that:(a) The franchisor
shall refrain from selling, distributing, or granting additional
franchises to sell or distribute, within defined geographic
territory, those products or services which are the subject of
the franchise.(b) The franchisee shall:(i) During the term of
the franchise, refrain from competing with the franchisor or
other franchisees of the franchisor or engaging in any other
business similar to that which is the subject of the
franchise.(ii) For a period not to exceed two years following
severance of the franchise relationship, refrain from engaging
in any other business similar to that which is the subject of the
franchise and from competing with or soliciting the customers
of the franchisor or other franchisees of the franchisor.(2) As
used in this Subsection:(a) "Franchise" means any continuing
commercial relationship created by any arrangement or
arrangements as defined in 16 Code of Federal Regulations
436.2(a).(b) "Franchisee" means any person who participates
in a franchise relationship as a franchisee, partner, shareholder
with at least a ten percent interest in the franchisee, executive
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officer of the franchisee, or a person to whom an interest in a
franchise is sold, as defined in 16 Code of Federal
Regulations 436.2(d), provided that no person shall be
included in this definition unless he has signed an agreement
expressly binding him to the provisions thereof.(c)
"Franchisor" means any person who participates in a
franchise relationship as a franchisor as defined in 16 Code of
Federal Regulations 436.2(c).
G. (1) An employee may at any time enter into an agreement
with his employer that, for a period not to exceed two years
from the date of the termination of employment, he will
refrain from engaging in any work or activity to design, write,
modify, or implement any computer program that directly
competes with any confidential computer program owned,
licensed, or marketed by the employer, and to which the
employee had direct access during the term of his
employment or services.(2) As used in this Subsection,
"confidential" means that which:(a) Is not generally known to
and not readily ascertainable by other persons.(b) Is the
subject of reasonable efforts under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.(3) As used in this Subsection, "computer
program" means a plan, routine, or set of statements or
instructions, including any subset, subroutine, or portion of
instructions, regardless of format or medium, which are
capable, when incorporated into a machine-readable medium,
of causing a computer to perform a particular task or function
or achieve a particular result.(4) As used in this Subsection,
"employee" shall mean any individual, corporation,
partnership, or any other entity which contracts or agrees with
an employer to perform, provide, or furnish any services to,
for, or on behalf of such employer.
H. Any agreement covered by Subsections B, C, D, E, or F of
this Section shall be considered an obligation not to do, and
failure to perform may entitle the obligee to recover damages
for the loss sustained and the profit of which he has been
deprived. In addition, upon proof of the obligor's failure to
perform, and without the necessity of proving irreparable
injury, a court of competent jurisdiction shall order injunctive
relief enforcing the terms of the agreement.
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